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MARSHALING OF ALL POTENTIALLY ADVERSE FACTS 
1. Respondent, Sheryl Angle [Angle], stated at the hearing that the reason given 
for being discharged was, "He just said that the situation was too uncomfortable 
there-some allegations by his parents and his brother, and he didn't feel comfortable with 
me working there any more." Agency Record (AR) p. 23:34-38. 
2. Instead of continuing to work Angle, "chose the severance." [Because Angle] 
didn't feel that it would be tolerable for either [Mr. Lambert or her] to continue there." 
AR p. 24:1-4. Angle indicated that June 21, 2005 would be her final day of work. AR p. 
25:22-35. Mr. Lambert testified that Angle told him prior to reporting to work for her 
final day on June 21, 2005 that she was accepting her severance pay. AR p. 31:27-32. In 
fact Angle has admitted, "After Mr. Lambert fired me in the presence of my attorney, on 
June 20th, I remained at my attorney's office and discussed with him my options. His 
recommendation was that I take the severance . . . I went to Mr. Lambert's office the 
next day having made the decision to take the severance." AR 52, beginning of 2nd and 
3rd paragraphs. 
3. After deciding to accept the severance pay rather than work, Angle alleges that 
the situation at work was tense because on her final day, she was told that: (1) all her 
communications were to be through employee Ms. Eyring, (2) she was not to answer the 
phones or speak with clients, and (3) she was not to do any gardening or maintenance 
work. She further complained that it appeared to her that an employee was scrutinizing 
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her work. AR p. 24:25-35. 
4. Angle further alleges that Mr. Lambert told her that employee Eyring "was 
worried that [she] was doing something [she] wasn't supposed to be, so he [had] came 
o u t . . . " AR p. 25:5-6. 
5. Angle further alleges that the situation at work was tense because she had, "a 
paternity suit with Mr. Lambert's brother," that had been going on for 3 years. AR pp. 
25:18-20,27:36-38. 
6. Angle further alleges that she chose to accept the severance pay because, "It 
just was very hostile. [Ms. Eyring] was very curt and rude to me, and Mr. Lambert just, 
unless he had some direct question that she wanted, wasn't speaking to me . . . Mr. 
Lambert's family has accused me and my family of some inappropriate activities that have 
never happened, and I just didn't feel that it was necessary for me to continue to take that 
kind of abuse." AR pp. 25:37-43, 26:1-6. Angle acknowledges that she learned of Mr. 
Lambert's family's accusations against her at the meeting of June 20, 2005 when Mr. 
Lambert informed her she could continue working until she found another job or she 
could accept severance pay. AR p. 27:40-43, 28:1-3. 
7. Angle further alleges that she chose to accept the severance pay because (after 
giving her last day's notice) her schedule had been switched, "from the Tuesday/Thursday 
9 to 5 to this 2 to 7 Monday, Tuesday, Thursday, and I was not able to cover those shifts." 
AR p. 26:12-19. 
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8. Angle claims she could not adjust her schedule "to cover those shifts" because 
she had, " . . . family and church obligations." AR p. 26:21-27. 
9. Angle never tried to discuss with Mr. Lambert any problems regarding her 
work schedule or work duties. AR pp. 27:31-34, 33:40-42. Her complaint against Mr. 
Lambert was that he, "didn't complain about [her] office work, and comments here and 
there that you'd like certain things done, but generally it was just extremely cold and [he 
was] curt." ARp. 28:20-23 . 
10. Mr. Lambert testified that the reason he acted in giving Angle the choice to 
accept severance or continue working until she found employment was because: 
. . . As far as the relation that [Angle] and I had, and how that was affected by the 
paternity sui t . . . [M]y concern was that over the months it appeared that she . . . 
was antagonistic toward my family and myself... [W]hat I noticed in an overall 
attitude. She . . . was not as friendly as she had been prior to this problem. She . . . 
was coming to work . . . very . . . down not upbeat. . . I viewed that [Angle] was 
developing an attitude . . . [S]he was starting to dictate when she would work, and 
when she wouldn't. And that doesn't work when you have an office of part-time 
employees where everybody has different concerns and different needs . . . I would 
have allowed a great amount of leeway . . . as long as I knew that she was 
diligently pursuing-getting another job. I did not put any limitations on how long 
she could stay and, again as a part-time employee, I thought that was a very doable 
situation . . . [S]he never talked to me about Exhibit I 7, and the instruction was 
not that she couldn't come talk to me, it's that I was trying to change things in my 
office, and I was detecting not only resistance from her, but. . . resistance from 
some of the other employees. There were communication problems that were 
occurring where I had employees telling me that they told [Angle] one thing, and 
then [Angle] telling me that she was told another thing, and I wanted all the lines 
of communication to go through my administrator to avoid a mis communication 
of what people were being instructed, and the other thing that we wanted to make 
clear, as far as what I had decided . . . that we wanted [Angle] to only do the job 
that she was hired to do . . . without being distracted by answering phones and 
addressing clients . . . [Angle] was also spending time on the phone and taking care 
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of what we thought was a part-time job of hers, and that was working for 
Creekside . . . [also] I felt that I could, instead of paying [Angle] $20 an hour to 
do the gardening, I could have my kids . . . and other people doing gardening for 
$6, and, you know, $7 an hour. AR pp. 29:15-43, 30:1-37. 
8. The parties stipulated that the allegedly false allegations, brought to Angle's 
attention of June 20, 2005, asserted by Mr. Lambert's family against Angle, were 
irrelevant to the proceedings. Angle specifically said, "I don't really think that that's 
relevant." AR p. 31:34-43, 32:1-16. 
9. When asked about her willingness to do other work by increasing the hours of 
her other part time job instead of accepting unemployment benefits Angle said, " . . . 
Shelly does the work and the people that she hires, you know, to mow the lawn and things 
like that-that's not really a productive use of my time.. ." ARp. 33:30-31. 
ARGUMENT 
I. A Marshaling of All The Potentially Adverse Evidence Does Not Inure To 
Angle's Benefit to Show Good Cause. 
As previously stated in, Granite School Dist v. Berry, 606 P.2d 1209,1213 (1980), 
the Utah Supreme Court held: "A claimant is ineligible for unemployment compensation 
when [she] voluntarily leaves [her] employment without good cause and remains 
ineligible for benefits so long as [she] continues to refuse to accept suitable work offered 
[her] by [her] employer." 
In Covington v. Industrial Comrn., 131 P.2d 207, 210 (Utah 1987) the Utah 
Supreme Court held: 
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In the case before us, the majority of the Board of Review ignored a substantial 
part of the record evidence before it and selected an isolated incident to deny 
Covington unemployment benefits. That action was arbitrary and capricious and 
cannot stand. Under the Board's own rules and regulations, "good cause" to quit is 
established if a claimant shows that actual or potential physical, mental, economic, 
personal, or professional harm would occur by continuing in her employment. 
Good cause is not shown if a claimant could have continued working while 
looking for other employment, had reasonable alternatives that would have 
preserved her job, or failed to give the employer notice of the circumstances 
causing the hardship and thereby allow the employer an opportunity to rectify the 
hardship. 
Here, the testimonies of both parties establish that on Monday, June 20, 2005, Mr. 
Lambert, in a meeting with Angle and her attorney, brought to Angle's attention that her 
ongoing 3-year paternity battle with his brother was causing tension between Angle and 
her employer. At this meeting, Angle also alleged that Mr. Lambert had informed her that 
his family had made allegations against her regarding the blessing of her child. However, 
as to these allegations, Angle stipulated that they were irrelevant to her request for 
unemployment benefits. ARpp. 23:34-38, 25:18-20, 27:36-38, 31:34-43, 32:1-16. 
Angle and the Agency, however, argue that, based upon this meeting, Angle had 
good cause to leave because on her last day of work: (1) she was directed to communicate 
through employee Ms. Eyring, (2) she was not to answer the phones, speak with clients, 
or do any gardening, maintenance work, (3) her work was scrutinized because there was a 
concern that she was doing something she wasn't supposed to be doing, and (4) her 
schedule had been switched, "from the Tuesday/Thursday 9 to 5 to this 2 to 7 Monday, 
Tuesday, Thursday, and [she] was not able to cover those shifts" because she had, " . . . 
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family and church obligations." AR pp. 26:12-19, AR p. 26:21-27. 
Without Angle having provided any detail thereon, Angle and the Agency further 
allege that she had good cause to quit and accept the severance pay because Mr. 
Lambert's employee had been very curt and rude to her and Mr. Lambert was only 
speaking to her when he had some direct question. AR pp. AR p. 24:25-35, 25:5-6, 
25:37-43, 26:1-6. However, except for these later two allegations, these alleged 
"stresses" at her work set forth in the preceding paragraph occurred after she had decided 
to quit. 
Angle admits that prior to her last day of work and the events thereon of June 21, 
2005 she, "chose the severance. [Angle] didn't feel that it would be tolerable for either of 
[her or Mr. Lambert] to continue there." AR p. 24:1-4. She thereby admits that she, in 
part, was a source of the tension and that June 21, 2005 was her final day of work. AR p. 
5:22-35. In fact, Mr. Lambert's testimony that Angle told him prior to reporting to work 
on June 21, 2005 that it would be her final day and that she was accepting her severance 
pay, is corroborated by Angle's letter to the Agency. In that letter she indicates that 
immediately after the meeting between Mr. Lambert, on June 20th, she and her attorney 
decided that she should take the severance pay and when she "went to Mr. Lambeifs 
office the next day," on June 21, 2005 she had decided, "to take the severance." AR pp. 
31:27-32, 52-beginning of 2nd and 3rd paragraphs. Therefore, what happened on June 21, 
2005 had nothing to do with her decision to quit and cannot be used to support an 
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argument that she had good cause to quit. 
Moreover, Angle never tried to discuss with Mr. Lambert any problems regarding 
her work schedule or work duties. AR pp. 27:31-34, 33:40-42. Her complaint against Mr. 
Lambert was that he was extremely cold and curt, is a conclusory statement that does not 
demonstrate that she would suffer, "actual or potential physical, mental, economic, 
personal, or professional harm would occur by continuing in her employment." Nor does 
this evidence show that she could not "have continued working while looking for other 
employment," or that there was no, "reasonable alternatives that would have preserved 
her job." AR p. 28:20-23. She also, "failed to give [Mr. Lambert] her employer notice of 
the circumstances causing the hardship and thereby allow the employer an opportunity to 
rectify the hardship." Since she did not do this, she cannot establish good cause. 
To the contrary, Mr. Lambert testified that the reason he acted as he did, was 
because Angle had become antagonistic toward him and his family, had become a grouch 
with a bad attitude, and was dictating her work schedule. Mr. Lambert was merely trying 
to change things in his office by making the lines of communications clear and by 
streamlining employee duties. Angle was resisting this change. These changes did not 
constitute "actual or potential physical, mental, economic, personal, or professional harm" 
to Angle and do not amount to good cause to quit. AR pp. 29:15-43, 30:1-37. 
When asked about her willingness to do other work by increasing the hours of her 
other part time job instead of accepting unemployment benefits Angle said, " . . . Shelly 
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does the work and the people that she hires, you know, to mow the lawn and things like 
that-that's not really a productive use o my time.. "ARp. 33:30-31. This statement, 
along with her assertion that her church and family duties prevented her from adjusting 
her schedule, and her refusal to work while finding additional employment, indicated that 
she was "refuse[ing] to accept suitable work offered [her] by [her] employer," and, 
therefore, had no willingness to be engaged in full time employment. She, therefore, is 
ineligible for unemployment benefits. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, none of the evidence equates to good cause to leave. Therefore, 
Arrow Legal Solutions respectfully challenges the Agency's conclusion that it 
immediately discharged the Claimant, that her termination was not a voluntary quit, or 
that the Claimant had good cause to leave. She had been working part time and she could 
have continued to work part time with no difficulty while looking for other employment. 
To be eligible for unemployment, one must be willing to work. She had a choice to 
continue working and she declined it. She voluntarily quit. 
Dated: (Wfc/15, Q&xc 
ARROW LEGAL SOLUTIONS GROUP, PC 
Kirsten K. Sparks 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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